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ESSAY
NOTICE, CONSENT, AND NONCONSENT:
EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN THE RESTATEMENT
Steven L. Willborn†
Privacy claims necessarily entail two determinations.  First, the do-
mains protected by privacy must be identified.  What spaces, thoughts,
or data are legally protected as “private?”  Second, what does it mean
when something is within a domain protected as private?  What limita-
tions does that impose on others (in our case, principally on employ-
ers)?  To what extent can the privacy holder consent to waive his or
her privacy protections?
Both of these determinations are especially fraught when the is-
sue is employee privacy.  In the employment setting, the employer exer-
cises a lot of control over the domains that might be protected by
privacy and much of that control is entirely justifiable.  The employer
might have security reasons for searching employees as they enter or
leave the workplace, productivity reasons for eavesdropping on em-
ployees as they work, and so on.  On the other hand, employees
should not have to give up all expectations of privacy when they enter
the workplace.  Similarly, when a domain is identified as private, em-
ployers often have a lot of authority to influence employees to waive
their protections.  An employer that says “consent to this drug test or
find another job” can be quite persuasive.1  Traditionally, consent has
been a complete defense to a privacy claim,2 but consent in the work-
place is very problematic.
† Judge Harry A. Spencer Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
Thanks to Eric Berger, Rick Dooling, Matt Finkin, Tim Glynn, Richard Moberly, and Char-
lie Sullivan.
1 See, e.g., Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. App. 1989)
(holding that an employer’s drug-testing program that required employees to consent to a
drug test or lose their job was legal and enforceable).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F cmt. a (1977) (describing defenses to pri-
vacy claims and stating that the absolute defense of consent applicable in defamation ac-
tions applies to privacy claims); id. § 583 (stating that consent is an absolute defense to a
defamation claim and incorporating general rules of consent as a defense to tort claims);
id. §§ 892–892D (stating general rules of consent as a defense to tort claims).  See also the
classic article on privacy by the principal author of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 419 (1960) (“Chief among the available
defenses is that of the plaintiff’s consent to the [privacy] invasion, which will bar his recov-
ery as in the case of any other tort.”).
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The Restatement of Employment Law had to address these diffi-
cult problems, and it had to do it in the face of a jurisprudence that is
vague, uncertain, and muddled.3  That type of jurisprudential land-
scape is fertile ground for a Restatement which, if convincing, can
shape the debate and guide development of the law.4  One of the
American Law Institute’s self-stated goals is to provide “clearer and
more coherent” statements of the law than currently exist “while sub-
tly transforming it in the process.”5  At the same time, however, the
landscape is treacherous, firm footholds are hard to find, and missteps
can cause avalanches that are difficult to predict or control.
In this Essay, I focus on three dimensions of employee privacy in
the Restatement.6  First, I will discuss the role of notice in identifying
the domains protected by privacy.  Notice is a concept that is taken
seriously in the Restatement, both in the privacy section and else-
where.7  The defining feature of notice is that it does not require any
employee recognition or acquiescence (and certainly not consent in
any real sense).8  Thus, it is a particularly powerful tool for employers.
Second, I will discuss the Restatement’s treatment of employee con-
sent.  Traditionally, consent is treated as a complete defense to an al-
leged privacy intrusion,9  but that is not how it is treated in the
Restatement.  Instead, consent is only one of many factors used in a
balancing test to determine whether a privacy invasion is highly offen-
sive.  Third, I will discuss the Restatement’s treatment of an em-
ployee’s refusal to consent to a privacy intrusion.  A perplexing
problem in employee privacy arises when an employer honors an
employee’s nonconsent and does not invade the employee’s privacy,
3 Privacy jurisprudence has undoubtedly progressed since 1956, when Chief Judge
Biggs famously described it as similar to “a haystack in a hurricane.”  Ettore v. Philco Tele-
vision Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).  But the wind is still pretty stiff.
4 See AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HAND-
BOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 5 (revised in part 2015)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK] (“A significant contribution of the Restatements has also been
anticipation of the direction in which the law is tending and expression of that develop-
ment in a manner consistent with previously established principles.”).
5 Id. at 4.
6 Chapter 7 of the Restatement is divided into two topics: privacy and autonomy.
This article considers only the privacy sections of Chapter 7.
7 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 2.05, 2.05 cmt. b, 2.06, 2.06 cmt. e, 7.06 cmt. g
(2015).  Note that while the black-letter language of section 2.05 is limited to notice that
provides limits on the employer’s power to terminate employees, other sections and the
comments speak more broadly of the power of notice.  See, e.g., id. § 2.05 cmt. b (stating
that notice can bind employers regarding “operational personnel decisions”); id. § 2.05
Reporters’ Notes to cmt. a (stating that notice can establish binding employer obligations);
id. § 2.06 (stating that notice rules apply to “binding policy statements”); id. § 2.06 cmt. e
(stating that notice applies to “personnel policy” statements).
8 See infra note 50 and accompanying text. R
9 This is the rule under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 2, and R
under the major privacy statutes. See infra note 45. R
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but instead fires the employee for failing to consent.  On the one
hand, this cannot be a privacy invasion because none has occurred.
On the other hand, something serious seems amiss.  The Restatement
addresses this issue explicitly by making it illegal for an employer to
discharge an employee for failing to consent to a wrongful privacy
intrusion.10
In Part I, I begin by discussing the general structure of privacy
protection in the Restatement.  The structure unpacks and repacks
the relevant issues in innovative and interesting ways.  Then in Parts
II, III, and IV, I discuss notice, consent, and nonconsent, respectively.
I
THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
IN THE RESTATEMENT
The Restatement proposes a three-step analytical structure for
considering employee-privacy claims.  In general terms, the analysis
begins by articulating a set of employee-privacy interests,11 and then
the next two steps progressively narrow the set to a much smaller sub-
set that is legally protected.  Under the second step, not all employer
infringements on employee-privacy interests constitute “intrusions”;12
under the third step, only those intrusions that are highly offensive
are legally cognizable.13
The Restatement sets out four categories where employees have
protected privacy interests:
1) The employee’s physical person, bodily functions, and personal
possessions.14
2) Physical and electronic locations in which the employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.15
3) Information of a personal nature which the employee has made
reasonable efforts to keep private.16
4) Information about the employee provided to the employer in
confidence.17
It is interesting that the first of these does not require any show-
ing of an expectation of privacy, which is traditionally required.18  sec-
tion 7.03(a)(1) says that an employee has a protected privacy interest
in his or her “physical person, bodily functions, and personal posses-
10 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.07 (2015).
11 See infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. R
12 See infra notes 30–39 and accompanying text. R
13 See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. R
14 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 7.02(a), 7.03(a)(1) (2015).
15 Id. §§ 7.02(a), 7.03(a)(2), 7.03(b).
16 Id. §§ 7.02(b), 7.04(a).
17 Id. §§ 7.02(c), 7.05(a).
18 Id. §§ 7.02(a), 7.03(a)(1); see infra note 57. R
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sions,” period (or at least semicolon).19  This conspicuously contrasts
with section 7.03(a)(2), which by its terms protects physical and elec-
tronic locations only when the employee has a reasonable expectation
of privacy, and with categories three and four above, which each con-
tain a close analogue to the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
requirement.20
The list of protected privacy interests does not include the most
modern—and perhaps most threatening—challenges to privacy: data
mining and aggregation.21  The possibilities of employer use and mis-
use of “big data” are enormous.  For example, employers may be able
to use publicly available information (consumer-marketing data,
credit reports, etc.) to predict drug use,22 health status or risk of in-
jury,23 pregnancy,24 and a host of other things.  The possibilities are
growing and scary.25  The Restatement rejects consideration of this
type of interest in a single sentence: “[D]ata mining may be less of a
concern in the employment context, as the employer already has ac-
cess to a wealth of information about its employees due to the nature
of the relationship.”26  But, of course, the information from data min-
19 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03(a)(1) (2015).  For discussion of this point, see
infra note 57. R
20 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03(a)(2) (2015).  Section 7.04 protects personal
information only if the employee has taken reasonable efforts to keep it private, while
section 7.05 only protects information that has been provided to the employer in confi-
dence. See infra notes 55–56.  Both imply that the employee would have a reasonable ex- R
pectation of privacy.
21 See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 150–52 (2013) (discussing the
dangers of aggregating “big data”).
22 See, e.g., Sean D. Young et al., Methods of Using Real-Time Social Media Technologies for
Detection and Remote Monitoring of HIV Outcomes, 63 PREVENTIVE MED. 112, 114 (2014)
(describing how social-media analysis can be used to detect drug use leading to HIV).
23 See Leslie Scism & Mark Maremont, Insurers Test Data Profiles to Identify Risky Clients,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000014240527487
04648604575620750998072986 (discussing an insurer that uses consumer-marketing data
such as financial indicators and website usage to predict the risk of illnesses such as high
blood pressure, diabetes, and depression).
24 See CHARLES DUHIGG, THE POWER OF HABIT: WHY WE DO WHAT WE DO IN LIFE AND
BUSINESS 182–97 (2012) (discussing how Target developed pregnancy predictions, includ-
ing due dates, based on consumer behavior, and recounting a story of the father of a
teenage girl who was surprised to learn from Target marketing that his daughter was
pregnant).
25 The distinguished sociologist Edward Shils called the last quarter of the nineteenth
century the “golden age of privacy,” not because privacy was well protected legally or by
custom, but rather because the technology for intrusive threats to privacy—like polygra-
phy, psychological screenings, and Facebook—had not yet been developed.  Edward Shils,
Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 292–93 (1966); see
also Matthew W. Finkin, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes—A Half Century On, 18 CANA-
DIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J.  349, 356–60 (forthcoming 2015).  Although no one will look back at
today and think of this as a golden age of privacy, big data portends the same quantum
leap in privacy threats as earlier waves of technological development.
26 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.04 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. d (2015).
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ing and aggregation may be used to sort through applicants as well as
employees, and the presence of other data seems unrelated to this
particular privacy concern.  For example, an employer who worries
about privacy claims over a drug test may instead seek the same infor-
mation through data aggregation.  The privacy concerns may be the
same, but an employee could challenge only the drug test as a privacy
violation under the Restatement.  Despite that, however, considera-
tion of data mining and aggregation as a potential privacy claim would
have opened up a Pandora’s box of difficult issues: how to define the
protected interest when the data is public (how much aggregation
needs to occur before a privacy interest arises), how to provide notice
(or consent) when even the employer may not know all the possible
uses for a data set, and more.27  Although the Restatement did not
state it this way, this may be a situation where the reporters were fol-
lowing Justice Kennedy’s admonition to move cautiously when think-
ing about the “implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear.”28  If that was the case, however, it probably
would have been better to leave a bigger crack in the door for later
consideration and development of this important set of privacy
interests.29
The second step of the analysis specifies when employers “in-
trude” on these privacy expectations.  The intrusion requirement op-
erates differently across the different privacy interests.  For the first
two categories of privacy interests, the employee’s physical person and
the employee’s location, the intrusion requirement imposes no limit
on the scope of the privacy interest.30  Some specific types of employer
activities are listed as intrusions, but their scope is broad and they are
not exclusive.31  On the other hand, an employee’s privacy interests in
personal and confidential information are significantly constrained by
the intrusion requirement.32  An employer would not intrude on an
27 Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier discuss several problems that big data presents to
the predominant consent regime in privacy law: (1) collectors do not always know the uses
for the data being collected, so informed consent at the time of collection is difficult; (2)
failing to give consent may leave a problematic trace (e.g., opting out of Google mapping
will leave a blank or blur on the map); and (3) anonymizing data does not work very well
because multiple data points facilitate identification. MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & CUKIER, supra
note 21, at 152–57. R
28 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
29 One option for leaving a bigger crack in the door would have been to say nothing
about it one way or the other, rather than to reject it so summarily.  Another option would
have been to note that data mining and aggregation may present privacy concerns but,
channeling Justice Kennedy, that it is too early in the technology’s development to address
them in the Restatement.
30 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03(c) (2015).
31 See, e.g., id. (“An employer intrudes upon an employee’s protected privacy interest
under this Section by such means as an examination, search, or surveillance . . . .”)
32 Id. §§ 7.04(c), 7.05(c).
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employee’s privacy interest in personal information if the employee
voluntarily gave the personal information to the employer,33 the em-
ployer’s disclosure was legally required,34 or the information was rele-
vant to the employer’s business needs35 and customarily required by
such employers.36  Since there would be no intrusion in those circum-
stances, the Section would permit an employer to gather (and pre-
sumably use and disseminate) the personal information freely.37
Similarly, for confidential information, no intrusion would occur if
the information is disclosed with the employee’s consent38 or if the
employer is compelled by law to disclose it to a third party.39
The third step of the analysis identifies the subset of employer
intrusions that is legally cognizable.  Only highly offensive intrusions
fall into this category, and “highly offensive” is defined as intrusions
where the “nature, manner, and scope”40 of the intrusion are clearly
33 This is true both because voluntary relinquishment would mean that the employee
had not taken reasonable efforts to keep it private, as required by section 7.04(a), and
because the employer intrudes only if it gets the information through an employer require-
ment. Id. §§ 7.04(a), (c).
34 Id. §§ 7.04(c)(i), 7.05(c).
35 Id. §§ 7.04(c)(ii), 7.05(c).  For information of a personal nature, an employer’s
business interests would be relevant at two points in a privacy analysis: (1) in determining
whether there is an intrusion, id. § 7.04(c)(ii), and (2) in determining whether the intru-
sion was highly offensive, id. § 7.06(b).  Thus, an employer has an opportunity to double-
dip on its business justification by claiming, first, that the justification means there is no
intrusion at all and, second, even if there is an intrusion, the justification means that it is
not highly offensive.  But there are subtle and interesting differences between the two.  For
example, section 7.04(c)(ii) refers to an employer’s “business needs,” while section 7.06(b)
refers to an employer’s “legitimate business interests.”  Are “needs” different than “inter-
ests?”  Can “business needs” exist under section 7.04(c)(ii) even if they are not “legiti-
mate?”  Or does “need” imply that legitimacy is required?  Is “customarily required by
employers” in section 7.04(c)(ii) intended to do the same work as “legitimate” in section
7.06(b), or are the words intended to suggest different analyses?  Could an employer prove
a business justification under section 7.06(b) after failing to prove one under section
7.04(c)(ii), or vice versa?  Unfortunately, the Restatement does not explore the relation-
ship between these two closely related inquiries or explain why these differences exist.
36 Id. § 7.04(c)(ii).
37 This would not be the case if the information falls into the narrower category of
personal information provided in confidence. See id. § 7.05.  That narrower category
might encompass legally required personal information but would not seem to include
voluntarily provided personal information or personal information relevant to business
needs and customarily required.
38 See infra notes 106–13 and accompanying text. R
39 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 7.04(c)(i), 7.05(c) (2015).
40 Id. § 7.06(b). Presumably, the “and” in this sentence should be an “or”; the com-
ments indicate that an “or” is intended. Id. § 7.06 cmt. e (“An employer’s intrusion upon
an employee’s privacy interests can vary by the nature of intrusion itself, or its manner or
scope, or both.”). Id. § 7.06 cmt. f (“If the scope of an intrusion extends beyond the pur-
pose of the intrusion in terms of the employer’s legitimate business interest, the intrusion
is unjustified.”).  “Or” was also used in prior drafts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW
§ 7.06(c) (Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2011).
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unreasonable when judged against the public interest or the em-
ployer’s legitimate business interests.41
This general structure is unusual in two respects.  First, in identi-
fying what employee-privacy interests are protected, the structure sep-
arates into three distinct steps what is often mushed together as one
step.  Consider, for example, the way in which the Restatement of
Torts defines intrusion upon seclusion: “One who intentionally in-
trudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of an-
other or his [or her] private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his [or her] privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”42
The Restatement explicitly disaggregates this into three separate
analyses: (1) does a privacy interest exist, (2) did the employer in-
trude on it, and (3) was the employer’s intrusion highly offensive?  A
significant benefit of this disaggregation is that, in contrast to the Re-
statement of Torts, it emphasizes that there are privacy interests that
ought to be respected and require attention, even if they do not rise
to a level currently meriting legal protection.43  Over time, it may be
that these “lesser” privacy interests will mature into legally protected
ones as employers develop practices and customs that protect them
and, as a result, nudge intrusions toward unreasonableness.
A second notable feature of the Restatement’s overall structure is
its treatment of consent.  The Restatement treats consent as only one
of many factors that are weighed to determine offensiveness, rather
than as an important and separate step of the analysis.  Consider again
the Restatement of Torts, which recognizes that consent is a complete
defense to a privacy claim.44  The major privacy statutes also recognize
that disclosures of otherwise private information can be made with
consent.45  In sharp contrast, the Restatement recognizes consent in
its black-letter language in only one narrow circumstance: section
7.05(b) says that an employer does not intrude on an employee’s pri-
41 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06(b) (2015).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
43 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1932–38 (1996) (arguing that some work-
place rules are better treated as unenforceable norms than as legally enforceable
requirements).
44 See supra note 2. R
45 See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012)
(stating that disclosure of personally identifiable information regarding video rentals is
permitted with consumer consent); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1232g(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (d) (2012) (stating parents or students may consent to
release of educational records); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42
U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(b)(1) (2012) (stating that genetic information can be disclosed with em-
ployee or labor union member consent); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY
OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 9 (2003) (stating that protected health information can be
disclosed with patient consent).
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vacy interest in confidential information if the employee has con-
sented to disclosure.46  For everything else, consent is not explicitly
mentioned as a defense at all.  Instead, it is mentioned only in the
comments as one consideration in determining whether a privacy in-
trusion would be highly offensive.47
This unusual treatment of consent is one of the central concerns
of this Essay.48  But I am going to consider the issue of notice first.
II
NOTICE
Notice is a particularly powerful tool for employers, and it is given
a big role in the Restatement.49  Notice is particularly powerful be-
cause it is one sided; the employer provides notice, and employee
agreement or even acquiescence is not required.50  To the extent
notice is readily available as a tool to narrow privacy interests, employ-
ers have great latitude.  At the same time, notice plays an important
role in privacy analysis.  Employment privacy is, of course, highly con-
textual and varied.  Security checks make sense before and after work
46 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.05(b) (2015).
47 Id. § 7.06 cmt. h.
48 See infra Part III.
49 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06(a) (2015) (stating that giving notice
allows the employer to modify or revoke prior binding employer policy statements); id.
§ 3.04(a) (stating that giving notice allows the employer to modify or revoke prior
promises or policy statements on compensation).
50 Assuming or continuing employment after notice is sometimes treated as acquies-
cence or even as implied consent. See id. § 7.06 cmt. h (“By taking a type of employment
with notice of the lowered expectations as to privacy, the employee effectively consents to
the reasonable requirements of the position, which may entail a reduced expectation of
privacy.”); see also Roberto Fragale Filho & Mark Jeffrey, Information Technology and Workers’
Privacy: Notice and Consent, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 551, 551 (2002) (stating that notice
is sometimes treated as implied consent but arguing that is an improper conflation of the
two concepts).  I set that argument aside.  The test of whether employee consent or acqui-
escence plays any role in a notice scheme would be whether an employee could avoid the
effect of the notice by expressly disclaiming consent or acquiescence to the notice in any
way other than refusing the job or quitting.  For example, could the employee avoid an
employer’s no-privacy notice by issuing his or her own notice saying he or she does not
accept or acquiesce to it?  The Restatement is clear that this would not be possible. RE-
STATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06(b) cmts. d–e (Proposed Final Draft 2015) (stating that
notice merely needs to “alert” employees to any change; employees who continue to work
“are deemed to have ‘accepted’ the change”).  The notice power is for employers to exer-
cise unilaterally; employee acceptance or nonacceptance is irrelevant.  To be sure, the rule
that quitting is the only way to withdraw consent to a privacy-limiting notice is odd: the
privacy intrusion can be avoided (albeit at a high cost) but the employee privacy right
cannot be protected.  The rule also seems in some tension with section 7.07, which tries to
protect employees from just such an impossible choice between protecting a privacy right
and unemployment. Id. § 7.07.  For a particularly devastating critique of presumed
employee consent to employer-privacy intrusions, see Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy
and the “Theory of the Firm,” 26 J. LAB. RES. 711, 714–15 (2005).  For an insightful but more
general critique of treating notice as consent, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 93 (2013).
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at prisons but less so at law schools.  Close monitoring of physical con-
ditioning makes sense for fitness trainers at a health club but less so
for clerical workers.51  Notice permits employers to tailor privacy poli-
cies for their particular workplace and provides warning to applicants
and employees about what to expect.  Thus, some deference to notice
seems proper and necessary.
The Restatement approach to notice has two dimensions.  First,
the ability to calibrate privacy through notice is limited to three cate-
gories where a reasonable expectation of privacy is in play: an em-
ployer can use notice to limit privacy with respect to physical and
electronic locations52 and with respect to confidential information not
protected by law,53 categories where there might or might not be rea-
sonable expectations of privacy.54  On the other hand, an employer
cannot use notice to limit privacy with respect to information of a per-
sonal nature55 or information required by law to be confidential.56
Similarly, the structure of the Restatement suggests that an employer
cannot use notice to limit privacy with respect to an employee’s physi-
cal person, bodily functions, and personal possessions.57  For these
51 See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 707 (1996).
52 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03(a)(2) (2015) (noting that employees have a pri-
vacy interest in locations only if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy).
53 Id. §§ 7.05, 7.05 cmt. b (stating that an employee has a privacy interest in informa-
tion if the employer has promised to maintain confidentiality or law requires
confidentiality).
54 I discuss the role of notice in these categories below. See infra notes 63–70 and R
accompanying text.
55 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.04 (2015) (stating that a privacy interest exists if
the information is of a personal nature and the employee has taken reasonable steps to
keep it private).  Interestingly, the expectation of privacy here is created through the em-
ployee’s actions in keeping the information private, rather than through any employer
actions or promises.
56 See id. § 7.05 cmt. b (stating that there is a privacy interest in information if the
employer has promised to maintain confidentiality or law requires confidentiality).  Here,
the expectation of privacy is created by law, which eliminates the employer’s ability to
override it by notice.
57 Section 7.03(a)(1) says flatly that employees have protected privacy interests in
these three categories without any mention of reasonable expectations, and that statement
contrasts sharply with the very next subsection, where privacy interests exist in locations
only if employees have reasonable expectations of privacy. Id. §§ 7.03(a)(1)–(2).  Al-
though section 7.03(a)(1) seems clear on this, the issue is muddied by section 7.02 and
comment a to section 7.03. Id. §§ 7.02, 7.03 cmt. a.  Section 7.02 introduces these three
interests with language that is less straightforward: it provides that protected privacy inter-
ests include “the privacy of the employee’s person (including aspects of his physical person,
bodily functions, and personal possessions).” Id. § 7.02(a) (emphasis added).  The penul-
timate and earlier drafts of the Restatement did not include this “aspects” qualifier. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03(a)(2) (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 8, 2014).
This new language implies that some “aspects” of an employee’s person, bodily functions,
and personal possessions are not protected privacy interests, but the Restatement provides
no guidance on what aspects might or might not be protected.  Perhaps the reporters are
suggesting that “aspects” are protected only if the employee has a reasonable expectation
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categories, expectations of privacy are conclusively presumed, so an
employer cannot use notice to limit them.
Limiting the ability of employers to constrict privacy through no-
tice in these categories makes sense, with one exception.  For informa-
tion of a personal nature, the privacy expectation is created through
the employee’s efforts to keep the information private, rather than
through any employer actions or promises;58 employer notice is irrele-
vant.  For information that is required by law to be confidential, it
would be odd to permit employers to override the law through no-
tice.59  And an employee’s interest in the privacy of his or her physical
person and bodily functions accords with widely shared social norms
in our society;60 thus, it seems reasonable to assume, even conclu-
sively, an expectation of privacy.  But the assumption is questionable
when the Restatement applies it to personal possessions.  Under this
assumption, any employer that conducts a standard security check
would intrude on its employees’ privacy interests, regardless of factors
such as the employer’s reason for the check, the notice provided to
employees, or the regularity of the practice.  On the one hand, this
probably does not matter since the employer would ordinarily be able
to prove that it was acting reasonably (or at least not “clearly unrea-
sonably”).61  On the other hand, as I mentioned above, one of the
of privacy with respect to them, but then one would have expected that language to be
used, especially since it is used in the same section to limit employee privacy interests in
physical and electronic locations.  As drafted, there is no guidance on how the reporters
intend the “aspects” limitation to apply.  Similarly, section 7.03 comment a says that “[i]f
the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to her person, physical functions,
personal possessions, or particular locations,” then an employer search would constitute an
intrusion. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03 cmt. a (2015). Note that the reporters proba-
bly meant “physical person” and “bodily functions,” since those were the terms used in the
black-letter statements.  Thus, this comment is in tension with the language of the black-
letter statements that do not contain such a “reasonable expectation” qualifier.  Despite
this muddiness, my best guess is that the Restatement intends a mandatory presumption of
privacy expectations for these three categories; otherwise one would be required to read
the more specific and direct statement of the privacy interest in section 7.03(a)(1) to mean
something other than what it says.  If this interpretation is correct, employer notice would
be insufficient to defeat privacy interests in an employee’s physical person, bodily func-
tions, and personal possessions.
58 See supra notes 16, 55 and accompanying text. R
59 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. R
60 See, e.g., Anita Allen, Privacy and Medicine, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (last revised
Feb. 28, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy-medicine/ (discussing norms of
physical privacy in the medical context).
61 Although recognizing this as a privacy interest may not cause problems under pri-
vacy law, it may have knock-on effects elsewhere.  For example, under the Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947, activities preliminary and postliminary to commencing work must be compen-
sated if they are for the employer’s benefit.  29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) (2012); 29 C.F.R.
§§ 785.24–25 (2014).  Thus, to avoid a Fair Labor Standards Act claim, employers often
claim that security checks are not for their benefit.  But if the security checks intrude on a
privacy interest, then employers must prove a business justification to avoid privacy liability.
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. h, illus. 15 (Proposed Final Draft 2015).  So
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benefits of the Restatement’s recognition of a set of privacy interests
broader than those that are legally protected is to enhance and sup-
port developing privacy norms.62  When the broader set is off base, as
this one seems to be, it undermines that possibility.  Thus, permitting
an appropriate form of employer notice to limit employee privacy in-
terests in personal possessions probably would have made sense.
The other dimension of the Restatement’s treatment of notice is
the set of rules that applies when notice is available to constrict em-
ployee privacy interests—most importantly, to narrow employee ex-
pectations of privacy in physical and electronic locations.63  The
privacy section of the Restatement has one reference to notice in its
black-letter provisions:  section 7.03(b)(1) says that employees have a
privacy interest when an employer provides “notice that the location
or aspects of the location are private for employees.”64  Fair enough.65
But what happens when the opposite occurs; when the employer pro-
vides express notice that a location is not private?  Similarly, what hap-
pens when an employer revokes a prior express notice of privacy
protection?
The Restatement’s black-letter language is silent on these issues.
But the comments say that a no-privacy notice will “generally” mean
that there is no expectation of privacy.66  The only exception men-
tioned is when the employer’s actual practices contradict the
no-privacy notice.67  Other than that limitation, neither the black-let-
ter law nor the comments hint at any limit on the employer’s freedom
to create no-privacy zones through unilateral notice.  The privacy sec-
under the Restatement’s conceptualization of this type of privacy interest, employers will
be put to the choice of admitting a privacy violation or paying up. See Integrity Staffing
Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 518–20 (2014) (holding that prework security checks
are not compensable because they were not integral and indispensable to the employee’s
principal work activities).
62 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
63 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. a (2015) (“[T]he
intrusion into physical or electronic locations is the most prototypical privacy invasion.
When we think of privacy, we tend to think of private areas such as one’s home, a bath-
room, or a closed office.”).
64 Id. § 7.03(b)(1).
65 One wonders if symmetry would require a privacy notice to be disregarded if the
employer’s actual practices were in conflict with the notice.  For example, would there be a
privacy expectation if the employer had a privacy notice in its handbook but openly and
regularly monitored the telephone conversations of its customer service representatives?
The Restatement says that no-privacy notices should be disregarded in the face of conflict-
ing practices. Id. § 7.03 cmt. j.  The Restatement does not address whether this rule is
symmetrical.
66 See id. § 7.03 cmts. f, j (stating that a no-privacy notice generally means no expecta-
tion of privacy); § 7.03 cmt. h, illus. 8, cmt. j, illus. 11–12 (giving illustrations where a no-
privacy notice means no expectation of privacy).
67 See id. § 7.03 cmts. j–k, cmt. k, illus. 13 (stating that a no-privacy notice means no
expectation of privacy unless contrary practices occur).
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tion of the Restatement is also silent on what should happen when an
employer revokes a prior notice of privacy protection.  But the Re-
statement’s prior treatment of notice says that employer promises pro-
vided through unilateral notice can be withdrawn unilaterally if
adequate notice is provided.68  Restatements strive to be internally
consistent,69 so these general rules would also seem to apply to pri-
vacy.  In sum, the Restatement permits employers to narrow employee
privacy interests through no-privacy notices so long as they do not
contradict their own practices, and it permits employers to withdraw
notices of privacy protection if they provide adequate warning about
the withdrawal.70
These rules afford employers great discretion to expand or con-
strict employee privacy through notice.  There is little doubt that em-
ployers will use this discretion mostly to limit employee-privacy
expectations.71  An open question, however, is whether the rules will
also encourage employers to enforce privacy-narrowing notices more
vigorously.  Under the Restatement, the only limit on the effect of
no-privacy notices is conflict with actual practice.72  Thus, the Restate-
ment reinforces the incentives employers have to issue no-privacy
notices and then to make sure that employees enjoy little privacy in
practice.73
68 See id. § 2.06 (stating that otherwise binding policy statements can be modified or
revoked through reasonable advance notice).  Section 2.06(c) lists exceptions to unilateral
withdrawal, but they would not apply to a privacy notice. Id. § 2.06(c).
69 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that ALI projects should be “not only R
internally consistent but consistent with each other”).
70 The autonomy section is a bit vague, but it also seems to adopt this version of
notice. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.08(b) (2015).  The comments to that section say
that the parties “impliedly agree” to the autonomy protections in the section, but they can
be altered by express agreement of the parties. Id. § 7.08 cmt. f.  It seems likely that em-
ployers would also be able to announce antiautonomy policies through unilateral notice, as
contemplated by section 2.06, although the reference to “express agreement” leaves this
somewhat uncertain. Id. § 2.06.  The condition for no-privacy notices that the employer’s
actual practices conform to the notice is not mentioned in the comment about an-
tiautonomy notices. Id. § 7.08 cmt. f.
71 AM. MGMT. ASS’N, 2007 ELECTRONIC MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE SURVEY 2 (2007)
(noting that 84% of employers inform employees that they review computer activity; 71%
inform employees that they monitor e-mails).  The worry that notice will be overused to
limit privacy rights is a traditional one that extends well beyond employee privacy. See
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384
(1974) (noting that if notice could be used to mold expectations of privacy, the govern-
ment could diminish Fourth Amendment rights “merely by announcing half-hourly on
television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being
placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance”).
72 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. R
73 The incentive to issue no-privacy notices is especially strong because notice can also
play a role later in the analysis in determining whether an employer’s intrusion is highly
offensive. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. g (2015) (stating that employer notice
“helps inform the employee’s reasonable expectations as well as the reasonableness of the
employer’s actions”).  The interaction between the roles of notice in these two separate
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This treatment of notice is quite ironic.  The rest of the privacy
section is very worried about employers abusing their authority, and
rightly so.  As I discuss later, consent is largely excised from the Re-
statement because of this worry.74  And yet, one gets to consent only if
there is a privacy interest in the first place, and the rules about notice
mean that employers have considerable discretion to narrow and even
eliminate those interests.  Close monitoring of consent to ensure that
employees can protect their privacy interests matters only when em-
ployees have privacy interests worth protecting in the first place.
But what were the alternatives to this generous treatment of no-
tice?  One alternative would be to go as far as some to say that an
employee’s privacy interests should not be defined or limited at all by
an employer’s notices, or even its practices.  As one court put it:
[A]n employer may not, simply by announcing in advance that all
employees will be subject to periodic strip searches, thereby defeat
the employees’ otherwise reasonable expectation that such searches
will not occur. Governing social norms, not the specific practices of an
individual [employer], define whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.75
issues (whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy versus whether an intrusion is
highly offensive) is an interesting one, but it is not explored in the Restatement.  All of the
illustrations in the Restatement where this might have been explored are ones in which the
answers on the two questions (the existence of an expectation of privacy and offensiveness)
are the same. Id. § 7.06 cmt. g, illus. 10–13.  The interesting cases would be ones where
there are different answers at the two stages.  Consider Illustration 12, which gets closest to
considering the interesting issues:
E works as a security guard in an office building in which X is located.  E
often works on the night shift.  M, a night manager at X, discovers that the
locked file drawer on M’s desk has been tampered with.  M arranges with
other X employees to conduct a video surveillance of M’s desk at night.
The video shows E tampering with M’s desk.  X had a substantial business-
related justification for secret videotaping of M’s office.
Id. § 7.06 cmt. g, illus. 12.  This is in the section on offensiveness so, although the Illustra-
tion does not tell us this, it must be hinting that this intrusion is not highly offensive.  But it
does not address the interesting questions because it is possible that in this no-notice situa-
tion, E did not have an expectation of privacy in the office in the first place.  But what
would be the result if instead the employer provided a notice of privacy protection (thus
creating an expectation of privacy), then violates it for this strong business reason (thus
muddying the issue of whether the intrusion was highly offensive)?  Would the notice then
be effective in creating an expectation of privacy but not sufficient to defeat the claim that
the intrusion was justified for business reasons and, hence, reasonable?  Or maybe violation
of the notice itself is sufficient to render the intrusion highly offensive?  The Restatement
does not tell us how to think about this kind of situation.  Or consider a situation in which
there is an explicit no-privacy notice which nevertheless did not undermine an employee’s
expectation of privacy (say, because of inconsistent practices).  Would the notice neverthe-
less have the effect of rendering an employer’s intrusion less than highly offensive?  Again,
the Restatement does not explore this or any of the other possible interesting interactions
between the roles of notice in these two distinct issues.
74 See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text. R
75 Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 671 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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There is also academic support for this position; Pauline Kim, for
one, believes that “[e]mployee claims to privacy . . . are not defined or
limited by idiosyncratic practices in the particular workplace.  Rather,
the legitimacy of employee expectations of privacy depends upon
broadly recognized social norms regarding privacy.”76  Interestingly,
early iterations of the privacy sections of the Restatement seemed to
be headed in this direction.  They were very explicit that reasonable
employee expectations of privacy flowed from “background social
norms.”77  They did not permit employer notice to limit these back-
ground social norms at all; employee agreement might limit some (but
not all) of them, but not unilateral employer action.78  However, this
approach was rejected early on,79 and probably rightly so—it fails to
recognize at all the valuable role of notice in privacy analysis.80
A narrower approach would have been to permit notice to play a
role in shaping privacy expectations, but to provide constraints.
Something like, “an employer cannot limit employee privacy through
notice in ways that are not reasonably necessary to the workplace or
that violate broadly held social norms.”81  Currently, the Restatement
recognizes an employer’s business interests as relevant to privacy
analysis, but uses them as a one-way ratchet in favor of employers.
Business interests permit employers to infringe on what would other-
wise be privacy interests of employees.82  Business interests could also
have been used as a ratchet in the other direction—to limit otherwise
unconstrained employer discretion to shape privacy expectations
76 Kim, supra note 51, at 709. R
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 5.03 cmt. h (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2004)
(stating that, with some exceptions, “whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy will typically turn on background social norms”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T
LAW § 5.03 cmt. i (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) (same).
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 5.04 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2004) (stating
that some privacy interests cannot be abrogated by notice or agreement; other types may
be abrogated only by agreement); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 5.03 cmt. i (Pre-
liminary Draft No. 3, 2005) (stating the same).
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 7.04 cmt. d (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2009)
(stating that general community standards about expectations of privacy “are relevant in
close cases but do not ordinarily override the actual understandings of the individual em-
ployees and employers”).
80 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text; cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, R
61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 109 (2008) (discussing societal norms in the Fourth Amendment
context and noting that “[t]he virtue of the ‘social expectations’ approach is that it avoids
circularity.  The vice is that it yields no answers”).
81 Finkin proposes a similar limiting principle to restrict employers’ ability to strip
away employee autonomy interests.  Finkin, supra note 25, at 376 (an employer may not R
restrict employee autonomy unless the restriction “is justified by the nature of the work
and is proportionate to that purpose”).
82 Section 7.04 says that requiring disclosure of personal information is not an intru-
sion if it is “relevant to the employer’s business needs.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW
§ 7.04(c) (2015).  Section 7.06 allows an employer’s “legitimate business interests” to be
weighed as a factor in determining offensiveness. Id. § 7.06(b).
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through notice.  Similarly, the ability of employers to narrow privacy
expectations through notice could have been constrained by impos-
ing limits on what qualifies as appropriate notice.  For example, the
Restatement could have indicated that notice is effective in limiting
privacy only if it meets certain form and timing requirements or only
if it applies clearly and specifically to the claimed privacy intrusion.83
The Restatement did not explore these possibilities for limiting em-
ployer notice.84
In sum, the Restatement establishes two notice categories.  In one
category, employer notices to narrow privacy expectations are disre-
garded.85  For the most part, the Restatement correctly identifies
those areas: information of a personal nature, information required
by law to be confidential, and matters relating to an employee’s physi-
cal person and bodily functions.86  The Restatement also includes an
employee’s personal possessions in this category; disregarding notice
there is a more questionable call.87  For the other category—which
includes the most common privacy situations—the Restatement is less
than clear but appears to provide employers with largely uncon-
strained discretion to limit employee-privacy expectations through
notice.88  Courts and commentators generally recognize that there
should be limits, so these rules were not required by current case law,
and I expect courts will, when necessary and appropriate, continue to
develop and apply limits.89  But the Restatement’s opaqueness repre-
sents a lost opportunity.  The Restatement could have provided much
better guidance to the courts (and employers) about the appropriate
83 For examples of cases where notice was held insufficient because it was not specific
enough, see Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1077–78 (Cal. 2009), National Eco-
nomic Research Associates, Inc. v. Evans, 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 337, 339 (Super. Ct. 2006), and
Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010).
84 Some limitations could be constructed by analogy to the limits on revocation or
modification of binding employer policy statements in section 2.06, but those limits do not
apply cleanly to employer privacy notices. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06 (2015).  Late
in the process, the reporters took a small step in this direction: in February 2015, they
added a sentence after a comment that says employer notice will generally defeat reasona-
ble expectations of privacy.  The new sentence says “[h]owever, expectations are not as
sharply formed by notice that is not clear, definite, or explicit, or not close in time to the
intrusion.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03 cmt. f (2015).  This is probably a step in the
right direction, but it is only a small step.  For example, it does not say that notice must be
clear, definite, explicit, and contemporaneous to be effective; so presumably, notice that
fails one or more of those criteria may still defeat an expectation of privacy.  Indeed, the
sentence could be interpreted to cut in the wrong direction since it implies that only
“sharply formed” privacy expectations are entitled to protection.
85 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. R
86 Id.
87 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. R
88 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. R
89 See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 660–65 (N.J. 2010)
(recognizing that employers may have the right to monitor workplace computers, although
reasonable expectations of privacy may fluctuate based on circumstances).
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role for notice in this class of privacy claims.  Now the courts will
mostly have to muddle through on their own.
III
CONSENT
A privacy regime would be incoherent if it did not provide an
adequate account of the role of consent.90  Within the domain pro-
tected by privacy, the thing protected is the individual’s authority to
consent or to withhold consent.91  Permitting consent recognizes the
individual’s right to express intimacy and offer invitations into pro-
tected spaces.92  In authorizing the individual to withhold consent,
privacy expresses society’s respect for an individual’s control over cen-
tral aspects of his or her existence.93  Many—perhaps most—discus-
sions of privacy include a statement like this about what Heidi Hurd
calls “the moral magic of consent”94: If there is consent, a rape is no
longer a rape, but lovemaking; a theft is no longer a theft, but a gift; a
battery is no longer a battery, but surgery, or sports, or massage.95
90 See 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, OFFENSE TO OTHERS
24 (1985) (“The root idea . . . of privacy is that of a privileged territory or domain in which
an individual person has the exclusive authority of determining whether another may
enter, and if so, when and for how long, and under what conditions.  Within this area, the
individual person is—pick your metaphor—boss, sovereign, owner.” (citation omitted)).
91 See, e.g., id.; ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (5th ed. 1968) (“Privacy is the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others.”); Elizabeth L. Beardsley,
Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in PRIVACY 56, 56–70 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1971) (describing violations of autonomy as violations of privacy);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (privacy . . . is the control we have over
information about ourselves.”); Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L.
REV. 275, 281 (1974) (defining privacy as “control over when and by whom the various
parts of us can be sensed by others” (emphasis omitted)).
92 See Fried, supra note 91, at 482–85. R
93 See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 169 (2007) (“The ability to consent is recognized in moral philos-
ophy as a central manifestation of personhood and individual autonomy.”); Mark A.
Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 781
(2009) (“The role of consent within tort law derives from the value of individual autonomy
or self-determination.”).
94 Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 (1996).
95 Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling: The Hidden Limitations of Consent, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 627, 628 (2006); see also Hurd, supra note 94, at 123 (“[C]onsent turns a trespass into a R
dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft into a gift; an invasion of privacy into an
intimate moment; a commercial appropriation of name and likeness into a biography.”).
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Consent, of course, is ubiquitous in employment law96 and in the
law generally.97  But consent is especially important within a privacy
regime because consent is the good produced and protected by pri-
vacy.98  The law may deprive employees of the right to consent to espe-
cially low wages or dangerous workplaces,99 but those infringements
on consent are different than limits on the ability of employees to
consent in privacy cases.  In those other cases, even if an employee
would consent, other interests are being protected, such as decent
wages or safety.100  With privacy, in contrast, the only good being pro-
tected is the employee’s ability to consent or not to consent.  Failing
to respect true employee consent in privacy cases undermines the very
interest privacy is intended to protect.101
This is not to suggest at all that consent within a privacy regime is
an easy issue.  Sometimes respecting an employee’s interest in consent
may conflict with important dignity interests,102 sometimes it may im-
96 See RICHARD CARLSON & SCOTT A. MOSS, EMPLOYMENT LAW 13 (3d ed. 2013)
(“[C]ontract remains the primary basis for determining the terms and conditions of em-
ployment . . . .”); Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of
Consent, 66 LA. L. REV. 975, 992 (2006) (“Employees consent to receive certain wages, to
changes in their health care packages, to their hours and working conditions, to
everything.”).
97 See, e.g., PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS
OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 293–94 (2004) (noting that “‘consent’ is a
major concept by which we organize and express our normative judgments of the  world”
and, as such, it ranks in importance with concepts such as justice, equality, freedom, prop-
erty, and responsibility).
98 Privacy is a broad concept and its precise parameters are hotly contested; for a
good exploration, see generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).  Under
some definitions of privacy, consent is more problematic and less central. See MAYER-
SCHO¨NBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 21, at 152–57 (discussing how consent is problematic as R
applied to data mining and aggregation).  But the Restatement limits its consideration to
the common-law tort of privacy and, in that area, consent plays a central role.  As the text
indicates, the good produced and protected by the common-law tort of privacy is the au-
thority of the rightsholder to consent or not to consent. See supra note 93.  This is con- R
firmed in the Restatement of Torts, which recognizes consent as an absolute defense. See
supra note 2.  For a similar approach to the concept of privacy as applied to employment, R
see Kim, supra note 51, at 698–709. R
99 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (holding
that the Constitution permits limitations to freedom of contract when such contracts affect
the community, health, and safety).
100 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), can be viewed through this lens. See David
A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003) (suggesting that
Lochner was wrong not because it recognized the important value of employee freedom of
contract—ability to consent—but because it failed to recognize the complexities of balanc-
ing that right against other important interests).
101 For more discussion of this point, see Willborn, supra note 96, at 994–96. R
102 In a much-discussed example, the Conseil d’E`tat in France and the U.N. Human
Rights Committee upheld on dignitarian grounds a ban on “dwarf-tossing” (a competition
in which men competed to see how far they could throw small people wearing a harness
with a handle on the back) even though the dwarves consented to the practice. See Human
Rights Committee, Manuel Wackenheim v. France, Comm. No. 854/1999, para. 7.4, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002).  For discussions of dignitary interests, see gener-
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pose harm on third parties,103 and sometimes Congress may have de-
termined that other interests outweigh the employee’s privacy
interest.104  Perhaps most importantly, monitoring the voluntariness
of consent within an employment relationship is very difficult.  Em-
ployers have many options for influencing or even coercing employee
consent.105  For all these reasons, dealing with consent in the employ-
ment setting is difficult and challenging.
Despite the central importance of consent, the Restatement’s ap-
proach to it is mostly one of benign neglect.  Certainly, it fails to grap-
ple with the difficult issues consent presents.  As with notice, the
Restatement’s black-letter principles make only one reference to con-
sent.  Section 7.05(b) suggests that an employer does not intrude
upon an employee’s privacy interest in confidential information if it
makes a disclosure with the employee’s consent.106  But even this ex-
plicit reference to consent is coated in vagueness.  The only reference
to consent in the comments to section 7.05 says that “[t]he employee’s
consent to the disclosure is ordinarily a sufficient reason to render the
[intrusion] reasonable.  However, consent obtained by threat of dis-
charge or other discipline does not constitute consent to the em-
ployer’s intrusion.”107
Several aspects of this are odd.  First, the black-letter language
suggests that obtaining the employee’s consent would mean there is
no intrusion at all.108  So one would think the first sentence should say
consent ordinarily means there is no intrusion, not that there was an
intrusion that was reasonable.  Reasonableness only enters the equa-
tion later, after an intrusion.109  Second, consent will only “ordinarily”
ally Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2011), and
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011). See also
Kent Greenawalt, Dignity and Victimhood, 88 CAL. L. REV. 779, 781 (2000) (stating that “slav-
ery is a wrong even if it is not experienced as negative by the slave and even if the slave
maintains a substantial amount of de facto autonomy” because it infringes on dignity).
103 See infra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. But see Willborn, supra note 96, at R
998–1001 (arguing that the harm to third parties constitutes an interest outside the privacy
regime).
104 See Willborn, supra note 96, at 1000–01. R
105 See Kim, supra note 51, at 717–20 (noting that because of the potential for em- R
ployer coercion, consent is especially problematic when applied to employee-privacy
claims); cf. Beth Hawkins & Andrew Harris, Honeywell Blocks EEOC Move to Halt Wellness
Penalties for Now, INS. J. (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2014/11/04/345837.htm (discussing an employer-wellness program that requires employ-
ees to consent to health tests, including blood tests, or be assessed a $500 surcharge for
their medical plan, lose up to $1,500 in employer contributions to health savings accounts,
and be charged up to $2,000 in tobacco surcharges).
106 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.05(b) (2015).
107 Id. § 7.05 cmt. d (emphasis added).
108 Id. § 7.05(b).
109 Whether the consent negates an intrusion or constitutes unreasonableness is im-
portant, as the former seems to be a single-factor toggle switch while the latter involves a
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be a defense.  What are the conditions under which it wouldn’t be?
Obviously, coerced consent would not justify a disclosure, but that
means there is no consent at all.  The “ordinarily” language seems to
signal circumstances in which real consent still wouldn’t be sufficient.
But the Restatement gives no hint of what those circumstances might
be.110  Third, assuming that the black-letter language means what it
says and an employer can disclose confidential information with the
employee’s consent,111 why is consent a defense only here and not
elsewhere?  Is privacy with respect to confidential information less im-
portant than privacy with respect to personal information112 or loca-
tions?  Is consent likely to be more reliable here?  The Restatement
makes no attempt to explain or justify this differential treatment of
consent.
Section 7.05’s black-letter treatment of consent covers only confi-
dential information.  For everything else, comment h to section 7.06
specifies the role for consent in privacy analysis: it is one of the factors
for determining whether an intrusion is highly offensive.113
Three aspects of this treatment of consent are noteworthy.  First,
comment h meshes awkwardly with the black-letter rule it is describ-
ing.  Section 7.06(b) says an intrusion is highly offensive if it is “clearly
unreasonable when judged against the employer’s legitimate business
interests or public interests.”114  As described in the comments,
balancing process in which consent could be overridden by other factors. See supra note 10 R
and accompanying text.  But as I have noted, the Restatement is vague on which it intends.
If consent is really intended to apply to intrusions, then the defense would seem to elimi-
nate the need for section 7.06 for confidential information. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW
§ 7.06 (2015).  If there is consent, there would be no intrusion and, hence, one would not
reach section 7.06.  On the other hand, if there is no consent and the employer discloses
confidential information, it is hard to imagine the circumstance in which that would not be
highly offensive.
110 As noted below, there is no “ordinarily” in the consent defense to a privacy claim in
the Restatement of Torts. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. R
111 The Restatement is not clear that an employee’s true consent will be a defense.  For
example, it says that consent will “ordinarily” justify an intrusion. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T
LAW § 7.05 cmt. d (2015).  This implies that there may be certain undefined circumstances
in which true consent will not justify an intrusion.  Similarly, as noted above, the comment
hints that consent may go to whether the intrusion was reasonable rather than to whether
there is an intrusion.  Consent would clearly be a defense if it went to whether there was an
intrusion, but it may not be if it goes to whether an intrusion is reasonable. See supra note
109. R
112 For nonconfidential personal information under section 7.04, the employee has a
privacy interest only in information he or she takes “reasonable efforts to keep private.”
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.04(a) (2015).  One could speculate that that requirement
would not be met if the employee consented to the release of the information.  On the
other hand, consent is mentioned explicitly in section 7.05 with respect to confidential
information and pointedly is not mentioned in section 7.04. Id. §§ 7.04, 7.05(b).  Unfortu-
nately, neither the black-letter language, the comments, nor the Reporters’ Notes provide
any guidance on this issue.
113 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. h (2015).
114 Id. § 7.06.
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neither the employer’s business interests nor the public interest cover
employee consent.115  As a result, while comment h clearly signals that
consent is relevant to offensiveness, it is only loosely tethered to the
black-letter rule of section 7.06.116
Second, as indicated earlier, the Restatement treats consent not
as an independent and especially important factor in the privacy anal-
ysis but as one of many considerations to determine whether an intru-
sion is unreasonable.117  This is in contrast to the Restatement of
Torts118 and much (maybe most) of the case law,119 which treat con-
sent as a stand-alone defense separate from the unreasonableness
inquiry.
Third, consent is treated grudgingly even within the limited role
it is accorded in the Restatement.  Here is the complete comment to
section 7.06 (not including the illustrations)120 on the role of
employee consent in determining whether an employer’s privacy in-
trusion is highly offensive:
Consent is generally an absolute defense to intentional-tort claims.
Restatement Second, Torts § 892A(1) (“One who effectively con-
sents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot
recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting
115 An employer’s business interests are described as “genuine concerns that affect the
employer’s ability to conduct its business effectively.” Id. § 7.06 cmt. c.  The public interest
is not described to capture any public interest in an employee’s personhood or dignity
(which might have encompassed consent), but rather as a category that captures interests
in “reliable, safe delivery of services” that are similar to the employer’s interests but some-
what broader. Id. § 7.06 cmt. d.
116 Until relatively late in the drafting process, consent was in the black-letter rule as
one of the explicit factors to consider to determine whether an intrusion was unreasona-
ble. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06(b)(4) (Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2011).
But it was eventually dropped from that status.  In the final version, consent was relegated
to the comments and Reporters’ Notes and, as indicated, only loosely tethered to the
black-letter rule.
117 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. h (2015).
118 See supra note 2. R
119 See, e.g., Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (“Like other
torts, there can be no invasion of privacy . . . if plaintiffs consented to defendant’s intru-
sion . . . .”); TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 160 n.5 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (noting that an employee’s “consent [is] a complete defense to his invasion
of privacy claim”); Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex. App.
1989) (noting that an employee’s consent “amounts to an absolute defense in any tort
action”).
120 The illustrations are also not very helpful in addressing the hard issues presented
by consent.  Illustration 14 presents a situation of possible consent through an employee’s
acquiescence. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. h, illus. 14 (2015).  That Illustration
is modestly helpful in pointing out the limits of constructive consent, but it tells us nothing
about the effect of true consent.  Illustration 15 is about unilateral employer notice. Id.
§ 7.06 cmt. h, illus. 15.  The illustration says that the notice “bolsters the reasonableness” of
the employer’s position, which it may. Id. § 7.06 cmt. h, illus. 15.  But the illustration does
not present a situation of true consent and, consequently, it also tells us nothing about
that.
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from it.”).  However, in the employment context, employee consent
obtained as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment is not
effective consent to an employer intrusion and not in itself suffi-
cient to provide a defense to wrongful intrusion under this Section.
Some types of employment involve reduced expectations of pri-
vacy, whether for reasons of safety, efficiency, or societal norms.  By
taking a type of employment with notice of the lowered expecta-
tions as to privacy, the employee effectively consents to the reasona-
ble requirements of the position, which may entail a reduced
expectation of privacy.121
The first sentence of this comment recognizes only grudgingly
that consent is a defense to a privacy intrusion.  It is worth noting that
there is no “ordinarily” in the Restatement of Torts defense.122  There,
if there is consent, there is no tort.  On the other hand, if there is no
consent, then there is no defense.  The Restatement of Torts provides
guidance at some length on what constitutes effective consent.123  The
second sentence of the comment says nothing about the conse-
quences of true consent.  Instead, it says correctly that when consent is
coerced by threat of discharge, it is not consent at all.  In that situa-
tion there is no true consent so, of course, consent cannot be a de-
fense.  The Restatement of Torts says as much, while recognizing true
consent as a defense.124  The third and fourth sentences are not about
consent at all, but rather about unilateral employer notice, which the
Restatement makes clear does not require consent.125  Those
sentences are about whether there is an expectation of privacy when
there is such notice, not about whether an employee consents to an
intrusion of a privacy interest after one is recognized.126  The most
notable thing about the comment, however, is that it provides no gui-
dance on the role of consent when an employee provides valid con-
121 Id. § 7.06 cmt. h.
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977) (stating that “consent . . . is a com-
plete defense”).  Section 583 states that consent is a complete defense to a defamation
action; section 652F applies the same rules to privacy claims. Id. § 652F (“The rules on
absolute privileges . . . stated in §§ 583 to 592A apply to the publication of any matter that
is an invasion of privacy.”).
123 Id. § 892 (defining consent); id. § 892A (discussing the effect of consent); id.
§ 892B (discussing the effect of mistake, misrepresentation, or duress on consent); id.
§ 892C (discussing the effect of consent to crime).
124 Id. §§ 892B(3), 892B cmt. j.
125 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. R
126 Logically, an expectation of privacy must precede any consent to an intrusion.  If
there is no expectation of privacy, then there is no need for employee consent.  The Re-
statement recognizes this elsewhere. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03 cmt. f (2015)
(“The employee either has reasonable expectations of privacy, and the analysis proceeds
forward (to [section] 7.06), or the employee does not and the inquiry ends there.”).  This
type of confusion about notice versus consent is common. See Filho & Jeffrey, supra note
50, at 551–52 (saying that notice and consent are often conflated, especially in the context R
of accepting new employment).
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sent to an intrusion of a protected privacy interest.127  In that
circumstance, is the consent a defense to the privacy claim or not?
The Restatement of Torts thinks it should be.128  Many courts think it
should be.129  I think it should be, because the nature of privacy neces-
sarily entails control by the privacy holder.130  But the Restatement
does not provide a clear answer.
So what should one make of this grudging treatment of consent
in the Restatement?  Frankly, as a practical matter, it will probably not
matter very much.  I doubt the courts will care much that the lone
comment on consent is only loosely tethered to the black-letter lan-
guage of section 7.06, and I expect they will continue to treat consent
as an especially important factor despite the Restatement’s attempt to
relegate it into a general balancing test.
But there is a minor practical loss and a more major philosophi-
cal one.  The practical loss is one of lost opportunity.  The Restate-
ment could have provided guidance to the courts on how to evaluate
consent.  The Restatement of Torts provides a nice guideline; it
recognizes that consent is a defense to a privacy tort but then provides
considerable detail on when consent should be treated as valid.131
This Restatement could have expanded on that approach and tailored
it for application in the workplace.  Christine Jolls, for example, has
argued that both the case law and behavioral economics suggest that
different weight should be placed on consent given contemporane-
ously with the privacy intrusion versus consent given in advance.132
127 This mushiness on consent is curious since the Restatement presents a toggle-
switch approach to the issue of whether there are protected privacy interests.  With respect
to them, the Restatement says there are no shades of gray—either there is such a privacy
interest or there is not. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.03 cmt. f (2015).  Such a toggle-
switch approach would have been possible with consent.  Indeed, since the Restatement is
highly suspicious of consent, it could have made the toggle sticky on the nonconsent side.
But recognizing that there are two possibilities (consent or nonconsent), and then stating
the consequences of both, would have been preferable to fudging both in describing when
consent is valid and what the consequences are if so.
128 See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. R
129 Many cases recognize consent as a defense to a privacy claim. See, e.g., Hill v.
NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 637 (Cal. 1994) (holding that consent to drug-testing outweighs the
student’s expectation of privacy); Doe v. Dyer-Goode, 566 A.2d 889, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (holding that consent to a blood test and relinquishment of a blood sample invali-
dates a later claim of invasion of privacy when that sample is tested for HIV).  There are
also many cases which recognize that consent is a defense but find that no consent existed
because of coercion, lack of clarity, or other reasons. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee,
74 S.W.3d 634, 648 (Ark. 2002) (finding coercion where the search went beyond the scope
of the consent); Pearson v. Kancilia, 70 P.3d 594, 599 (Colo. App. 2003) (finding coercion
where an employer demanded sex from an employee).  I know of no cases which hold that
valid consent does not constitute a valid defense to a privacy claim.
130 See supra note 91; Willborn, supra note 96, at 992–1001. R
131 See supra notes 122–26. R
132 See Christine Jolls, Rationality and Consent in Privacy Law 40–48 (Dec. 10, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Christine M. Reilly, Achieving
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Alex Long has explored (and criticized) the special consent rules that
apply to defamation claims.133  I have suggested that consent in em-
ployee-privacy cases should be evaluated based on factors such as the
invasiveness of the privacy intrusion, the level of employer pressure,
and the employer’s business interests.134  The point here is not that
any of these approaches are the proper one, but rather that this Re-
statement failed to grapple with consent and, in so doing, missed an
opportunity to provide guidance to the courts on this important
issue.135
More philosophically, the Restatement’s treatment of consent di-
minishes the role of privacy in supporting and enhancing employee
dignity.  In the Restatement’s formulation, the wrongfulness of a pri-
vacy intrusion depends mostly on the employer’s actions.  An em-
ployee’s consent is relevant in a tangential way, but the focus is on the
employer’s interests and actions.136  In contrast, if employee consent
were treated more seriously, the focus would be on the employee’s con-
trol over his or her own privacy interests.  That control is important
philosophically on one level because it is the very good that is pro-
duced and protected by privacy law.137  It is an important part of the
general structure of privacy protection.  On a deeper level, employee
consent is important because safeguarding the control of employees
over important aspects of their lives requires respect for their choices
and enhances their dignity.  In a world where the threats to employee
dignity and autonomy are real and ever present,138 the need to affirm
Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Con-
tracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1245–51 (2002) (discussing how notice is
less meaningful at the outset of an employment contract).  For a particularly fascinating
exploration of the need in some circumstances for contemporaneous consent, see Katz,
supra note 95, at 652–56. R
133 See Alex B. Long, The Forgotten Role of Consent in Defamation and Employment Reference
Cases, 66 FLA. L. REV. 719, 733–41 (2014).
134 Willborn, supra note 96, at 1001–08. R
135 The Restatement’s position may be that true consent is (almost) never possible in
the workplace.  If so, then it should have announced and defended that position.  The
position would be difficult to reconcile with the nature of a privacy regime, but there are
certainly respectable starting points for such an argument. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Due
Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495, 506 (1908) (noting that some-
day it may be recognized “that the uncontrolled exercise of the advantages derived from
possessing the means of living of other men will . . . become recognized as giving no social
benefit corresponding to the evils which result”).  But the Restatement does not articulate
such a position or attempt to defend it.
136 See supra notes 114–19 and accompanying text. R
137 See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. R
138 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 21, at 150–52 (discussing the R
dangers of aggregating “big data”); Kim, supra note 51, at 673 (discussing some of the R
activities in the workplace that create privacy issues, such as “[p]ersonal property searches,
intrusive questionnaires, mandatory polygraph testing and pre-employment psychological
screening”).
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them wherever possible is increasingly important.  By downgrading
consent, the Restatement cuts in the opposite direction.
IV
NONCONSENT
The Restatement also has a provision explicitly protecting an em-
ployee’s right to refuse consent to a privacy violation: “An employer
who discharges an employee for refusing to consent to a wrongful em-
ployer intrusion upon a protected employee privacy interest under
this Chapter is subject to liability for wrongful discharge in violation of
well-established public policy under Chapter 5.”139
This is a necessary and salutary adjunct to privacy protections.140
In its absence, an employee would be put to an unacceptable choice
between consenting to a privacy intrusion and suing for damages later
or refusing to consent and losing his or her job.141  At the same time,
the provision seems odd given the Restatement’s general treatment of
consent.  The strongest employer option for restricting employee pri-
vacy under the Restatement is through notice, which does not require
employee consent.142  This provision provides no protection there.
Consent itself under the Restatement is determinative in only one nar-
row circumstance.143  Elsewhere, the effect of consent is
nondeterminative.144  But, of course, protecting the right to refuse
consent will be powerful and necessary only to the extent that consent
is powerful.  Thus, the provision is in tension with the general treat-
ment of consent in the Restatement.
Section 7.07’s nonconsent protection relies specifically on the
public-policy protections of Chapter 5 of the Restatement,145 but the
relationship between the two is awkward.  Consider the second illus-
tration in comment c to section 7.07:
139 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.07 (2015).
140 For perhaps the best explication of the argument that any meaningful protection
of employee privacy requires limits on employment at will, see Kim, supra note 51, at R
677–82.
141 The trade off is especially harsh because some courts have held that voluntary sub-
mission to the privacy intrusion suffices as consent, so there would be no privacy claim
under the first option. See, e.g., Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (D. Kan. 1998)
(holding that “consent to a drug test may be inferred when an employee provides a urine
sample upon request and, further, that the inference of consent is not negated by the mere
fact that refusal to consent may result in termination”); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs.,
Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 253–54 (Tex. App. 1993) (finding no violation of the right to privacy
where an employee voluntarily submitted to drug test—fraud and threat of job loss did not
invalidate the consent).
142 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. R
143 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. R
144 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. R
145 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.07 (2015).
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X requires its employees to be randomly tested for use of illegal
drugs.  The employees in question drive large trucks on major high-
ways.  X’s implementation of the testing program would not be a
wrongful invasion of the employees’ privacy.  However, E believes in
good faith that the test is a wrongful invasion of his privacy rights.  E
refuses to take the test, and X fires E.  X has not committed a viola-
tion under this Section.146
This Illustration is designed to show the principle of comment c
that, for section 7.07 to apply, the employer must demand consent for
something that would constitute an actual privacy violation; the em-
ployee’s good-faith and reasonable belief that the employer’s demand
might constitute a privacy violation would not be sufficient.147  As sup-
port for this, comment c points to section 5.02(d), which requires that
the demand for consent must be for something that would actually
violate public policy.148  But the problem is that section 5.02(d), by its
terms, protects only refusals to waive nonnegotiable or nonwaivable
rights, while privacy rights almost by definition are negotiable and
waivable.149
This nonnegotiable/nonwaivable issue could have been avoided
if the reference had been to section 5.02(a) of the public-policy provi-
sion instead of to section 5.02(d).150  Section 5.02(a) seems to apply
more straightforwardly to the Illustration; it protects an employee who
refuses to commit an act (for example, submit to a drug test) that the
employee reasonably and in good faith believes violates a
well-established public policy.151  The problem, however, is that sec-
tion 5.02(a) (and all the subsections except (d)), protect reasonable,
good-faith beliefs about public-policy violations as well as actual viola-
tions.152  As a result, section 7.07 comment c implicitly disclaims reli-
ance on section 5.02(a) even though it would seem to apply on its
146 Id. § 7.07 cmt. c, illus. 2.
147 Id. § 7.07 cmt. c.
148 Id. § 5.02(d) cmt. c.
149 Id. § 5.02(d).  As discussed earlier, the good protected by privacy law is precisely
the ability of the rightsholder to consent or refuse to consent to disclosure, which is close
to the definition of negotiable and waivable. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying R
text.  Comment e to section 5.02 fudges on the nonnegotiability requirement a bit. RE-
STATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.02 cmt. e (2015).  Even though the black-letter language does
not support it, the comment says that a particularly strong and broadly recognized public
interest (such as the right to choose one’s own counsel) may support a claim against an
employer for insisting on a waiver, even if the underlying right is negotiable. Id. Although
the comment lists several examples of negotiable rights that might be protected, privacy is
not one of them.
150 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 5.02(a), (d) (2015).
151 Id. § 5.02(a).
152 Id. § 5.02.
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face, presumably because it provides too much protection to reasona-
ble but mistaken privacy-sensitive employees.153
Section 7.07 also has an awkward relationship with the public-pol-
icy protections of Chapter 5 because the underlying rationale for the
privacy protection is shakier.  Chapter 5 makes clear that the primary
rationale for public-policy protection is avoiding harm to third par-
ties.154  For example, one comment to section 5.02 says that to be pro-
tected “an employee must be discharged for performing a public legal
obligation and not merely a personal [one].”155  In contrast, section
7.07 comment b says it aims to “empower[ ] [an employee] to protect
her personal interests.”156
But in a way, this awkward fit with the public-policy provision is
beside the point.  One might have hoped that the two sections could
have been brought into better alignment to provide clearer guidance.
But to the extent consent is central to employee privacy,157 protecting
it is a necessary and salutary aspect of privacy protection.  Stretching
the public-policy tort of Chapter 5 seems like a reasonable move to
provide that protection.158
Having said that, however, there is a more subtle problem with
section 7.07.  When it does provide protection, section 7.07 has two
consequences, one good and another more problematic.  First, the
provision has its intended effect: it protects the freedom of employees
to consent or not consent.  In that way, it aligns directly with the prin-
cipal goals and purposes of privacy protection: to protect an individ-
ual by ensuring his or her domain over private information.159  But
153 Id. §§ 7.07 cmt. c, 502(a).
154 Id. § 5.01 cmt. a.  The reporter for that section wrote a persuasive article articulat-
ing protection of third parties as the principal rationale for the tort of wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy. See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the
Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (1996).
155 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.02 cmt. c (2015).
156 Id. § 7.07 cmt. b.  The same sentence continues to say that, at the same time, the
employer policy is likely to affect other employees adversely and impair the public interest.
Id.  But the first and primary rationale—the personal interest—is the one in some tension
with the primary rationale for Chapter 5: the protection of third-party interests.
157 Again, I think consent is central to privacy, but the other sections of the Restate-
ment degrade its importance.  One interpretation of section 7.07 could be that consent
really is viewed as central under the Restatement.  But if so, it is a backhanded way of
emphasizing consent’s centrality.
158 By its terms, section 7.07 protects only against discharges. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T
LAW § 7.07 (2015).  Comment c makes it clear that constructive discharge is also prohib-
ited. Id. section 7.07 cmt. c.  It is unclear, however, whether the prohibition would apply to
other, lesser forms of retaliation such as a pay reduction, demotion, or reassignment.  In
Chapter 5, which is the basis for section 7.07’s protections, the reporters expressly note
that the Restatement takes no position on whether public-policy tort claims extend to em-
ployer retaliation short of constructive discharge.  Id. § 5.01 cmt. c. Presumably, that ap-
proach would also apply to the protections of section 7.07.
159 Id. § 7.01 cmt. a.
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the provision also has the effect of allocating the costs of protecting
employee privacy away from that individual and toward the employer.
Sometimes that is not problematic at all—for example, when there is
little to no cost to the employer (as in the first illustration above).  But
sometimes there is a cost, and perhaps it should be part of the equa-
tion.  Consider this real-life example:
Trevis Smith, a former University of Alabama linebacker, plays for
the Saskatchewan Roughriders in the Canadian Football League.
With his consent, the team administers an HIV test and discovers
that he has the virus.  But he does not consent to the release of the
information.  Can the Roughriders release him from the team for
his refusal to consent?160
If releasing the information would be a privacy violation,161 then
section 7.07 would make it illegal for the Roughriders to discharge
Smith from the team.162  The problem here is that this would expose
other players to the risk of HIV infection.163  As a result, some of the
cost of protecting Smith’s right to refuse consent is borne by third
parties (or by the employer if it were eventually held liable for infec-
tions of other players).  Ironically, the Roughriders are in much the
same position as employees who seek public-policy tort protection: both
want to be able to release information to protect third-party interests.
Sections 5.01 and 5.02 safeguard an employee in that situation, but
section 7.07 penalizes employers who act to protect third-party
interests.164
160 This example is taken from Willborn, supra note 96, at 987. See Canwest News Ser- R
vice, The secret life of Trevis Smith, CANADA.COM (Dec. 3, 2005), http://www.canada.com/
theprovince/story.html?id=dced6e21-bee4-4183-95d3-da83cf3a9ab2.
161 The Restatement is clear that release of Smith’s HIV status would constitute an
intrusion on a protected privacy interest. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.05 (2015).
Smith has a protected privacy interest in the information, as it was provided to the em-
ployer in confidence. Id. § 7.05(a).  The employer intrudes on that interest if it releases it
without Smith’s permission. Id. § 7.05(b).  The issue would be whether the release was
highly offensive. Id. § 7.06.  The Roughriders do have good business and public reasons to
release the information.  If those interests outweighed the intrusion on Smith’s privacy
interest, then the Roughriders could release the information without his permission or,
alternatively, discharge him for refusing to consent to its release.  The Restatement pro-
vides no guidance on how to analyze this type of situation—that is, one where there is no
consent to release confidential information but a strong business interest to do so.  But I
set that issue aside to permit me to explore the distributional consequences of protecting
Smith’s right to refuse consent.
162 Id. § 7.07.
163 Alternatively, the employer could continue to employ him but not let him play.
This option would force the employer to continue to pay a worker even though he cannot
perform the job for which he was hired.
164 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 5.01, 5.02 (2015).  Note that section 7.07 comment
c seems to permit balancing, but that concept is not present in the black-letter language of
either Chapter 5 or section 7.07. Id. § 7.07 cmt. c.
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In sum, section 7.07 is a necessary adjunct to employee-privacy
protections.  Perhaps the relationship between it and the public-policy
tort protections on which it is based could have been better ex-
plained.  Perhaps the section could have more clearly protected
against more than discharge.  Perhaps some attention might have
been paid to the possible costs of nonconsent.  But this type of protec-
tion for nonconsent is proper and necessary and, indirectly, the sec-
tion signals that consent is central to the protection of employee
privacy.  The courts may need to refine the protection, but section
7.07 is a good beginning.
V
CONCLUSION
Employee privacy provided fertile ground for a Restatement.  Re-
statements present an opportunity to step back from “the episodic oc-
casions for judicial formulations presented by particular cases”165 and
to scan the entire field to make an area “clearer and more coherent
while subtly transforming it in the process.”166  Given the muddled
and confused state of the common law applying to employee privacy,
there is much to step back from, much to make clearer and more
coherent, and much to subtly transform.167
In important respects, the privacy section of the Restatement is
successful in this process of clarification and subtle transformation.
For example, the Restatement’s disaggregation of the analysis into
three steps—is there an employee-privacy interest, did the employer
intrude on it, and was the intrusion highly offensive—makes the anal-
ysis clearer and more coherent.168  Even more importantly, the disag-
gregation encourages identification and consideration of
employee-privacy interests that are present and important even
though not currently legally protected.169  By focusing attention on
this class of non-legally protected employee-privacy interests, the Re-
statement could facilitate their eventual maturation into legally pro-
tected rights.170  Thus, this aspect of the Restatement aligns well with
the American Law Institute’s goal of embracing—and even encourag-
165 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 5. R
166 Id. at 4.
167 Pauline Kim has argued that employee privacy rights are particularly well suited to
common-law development because of their fact-specific nature and because emerging tech-
nologies and social norms are constantly evolving.  Kim, supra note 51, at 727.  If true, this R
also enhances the promise of the Restatement project. But see Matthew W. Finkin, Preface to
the Third Edition, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW xx (3d ed. 2009) (suggesting that tort law is
ill suited for the development of privacy law because it is backward looking, expensive, and
time consuming).
168 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. R
169 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
170 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
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ing—the common law’s “flexibility and capacity for development and
growth.”171
Similarly, the Restatement empowers employees to protect their
privacy interests by refusing consent.  This filled a lacuna in employee-
privacy law which put employees to a Hobson’s choice between their
privacy and their job.  The Restatement may not have done this
smoothly—it may not have been possible to do it smoothly—but it
addresses this problem and may (at least should) encourage courts to
follow its lead.172  In this respect again, the Restatement is rightly call-
ing on the common law’s flexibility and capacity for development and
growth.
But in other respects, the Restatement fails to meet the ALI’s
goals of clarity and coherence.  On employer notices about privacy,
the Restatement hints of unrestrained employer discretion, mostly by
failing to discuss whether limits exist.173  On consent, the Restatement
suggests that perhaps courts should disregard even true consent, while
providing almost no guidelines to evaluate voluntariness.174  On refus-
als to consent, the Restatement makes progress, but does not consider
the possibility of third-party harm.175
The damage from these limitations is likely to be limited.  Courts
will constrain the ability of employers to limit privacy through unilat-
eral notice.  They will evaluate consent rigorously.  They will attempt
to limit third-party harm from nonconsent.  The loss is not that the
Restatement will affirmatively mislead the courts on these issues, but
rather one of missed opportunity.  The Restatement could have, but
does not, help courts address issues they are certain to face and that
are central to employee privacy.
A final worry about the Restatement is that the privacy interests it
protects are closely tethered to those recognized in the Restatement
of Torts.  The privacy provisions are presented as applications of the
“intrusion upon seclusion” and “public disclosure of private facts”
prongs of the Torts Restatement.176  On the one hand, this makes per-
fect sense; Restatements are intended to describe “the law as it
presently exists,”177 and the Restatement of Torts is the canonical
description of privacy that has shaped current law for decades.178  On
171 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 5. R
172 See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text. R
173 See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. R
174 See supra notes 123–33 and accompanying text. R
175 See supra notes 154–67 and accompanying text. R
176 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.01 cmt. a (2015).
177 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 4. R
178 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1890 (2010) (“Even today, most courts look to the Restatement’s formula-
tion of the privacy torts as the primary authority.”).
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the other hand, much has happened in those decades to pose new
threats to employee privacy, and much more is on the way.179  Every-
day life—and life as an employee—is monitored in many ways today
that would have been unimaginable when the Restatement of Torts
was last revised.180  The Restatement does not attend to these new
threats at all and, as a result, shies away from “subtly transforming”181
the law to address new circumstances.  Perhaps it is still too early to
attend to these new types of threats.  Perhaps the “subtle transforma-
tion” that would have been required to attend to these developments
would have been too great.182  But these rationales for limiting the
scope of privacy protection, good as they may be, do not ease the
worry that this Restatement may become, like the Restatement of
Torts,183 the limit of the reach of privacy protection, rather than a
framework for addressing new challenges.
179 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.07 (2015).
180 For example, the authors of the Restatement of Torts would not have imagined
that millions of us would be wearing technology that records our every breath and step or
that our actions would be monitored so that advertisements can be personalized to our
preferences. See supra note 139; Felix Salmon, The Uncanny Valley of Advertising, WIRED R
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/04/uncanny-valley-of-ads/.
181 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 4. R
182 For a good discussion of the ways in which big data requires a broad rethinking of
privacy, see Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The Importance of Information Policy,
14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 117–24 (2014).
183 Matthew W. Finkin, Law Reform American Style: Thoughts on a Restatement of the Law
of Employment, 18 LAB. LAW. 405, 416 n.23 (2003) (“When the four [privacy] torts were
codified forty years ago, the [Restatement of Torts] stated that that codification was with-
out prejudice to additional categories of privacy yet to achieve legal recognition.  But in
the decades since, despite the explosion in privacy invasive technology and its deployment,
not a single new tort has been recognized.  The Restatement’s quadripartite taxonomy has
become canonical: In case after case, the courts recite the fact that ‘privacy’ is covered by
one of four torts and if it is not covered, it is not privacy.”).
